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S T A L I N , C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A , A N D T H E M A R S H A L L 
P L A N : N E W D O C U M E N T A T I O N F R O M C Z E C H O -
SLOVAK A R C H I V E S 
Founded in Prague in 1990, the Institute of Contemporary History devotes its 
efforts, among other things, to the publication ofhitherto inaccessible archive materials. 
Multi-volume editions of documents concerning various thematicgroups are beingpre-
pared, which will be of great value for Czechoslovak historiography and beyond. 
Consequently, an agreement was concluded with the publishers of the Journal Bohe-
mia, under which selected documents will appear here in irregulär intervals in English 
translation und thus be made accessible to the international public. 
The first instalment of the series presents the minutes of a discussion between Stalin 
and members of a governmental delegation from Czechoslovakia held in Moscow on 
9July 1947 and concerning Czechoslovakparticipation in the Marshall Plan. The docu-
ment is introduced by Karel Kaplan and supplemented with an analysis by Vojtech 
Mastný. It was translated from the Czech byjohn M. Deasy. 
Introduction by Karel Kap lan 
In th e post- war histor y of Europe , on th e way int o th e Col d War and Europe' s divi-
sion int o two camps , th e Marshal l Plan played a significant role . In view of th e chang e 
in th e Soviet Union' s Europea n policy, on e ma y speak of a milestone . I t was also an 
importan t event in post-wa r Czechoslovakia , which stirred up and influence d tha t 
country' s politica l life. Of th e states within th e Soviet spher e of influence , onl y th e 
PraguegovernmentdecidedtoattendtheParisConferenceontheMarshallPlan . Poland , 
which originally had th e same intention , change d her attitude . Th e Czechoslova k 
governmen t discussed th e Marshal l Plan on 24 Jun e 1947 for th e first tim e and , for want 
of information , it instructe d a commissio n of minister s to pursu e th e matter . O n July 4, 
th e governmen t approve d attendanc e at th e Conferenc e in Pari s which ha d been conven -
ed by Grea t Britain and France . I t decide d tha t it would be represente d by th e Ambassa-
do r in Paris , and entruste d its Presidiu m with appointin g th e delegatio n and th e "issuing 
of Instructions. " I t furthe r decide d to send a governmen t delegatio n to Moscow , heade d 
by Prim e Ministe r Klemen t Gottwald , with Foreig n Ministe r Jan Masary k and Foreig n 
Trad e Ministe r Huber t Ripka , who was replace d by Ministe r Proko p Drtin a because of 
illness. Two days later , th e Soviet diploma t Bodro v hande d Ministe r Masary k a not ě 
abou t th e result s of th e preliminar y negotiation s of th e thre e Foreig n Minister s of th e 
Soviet Union , France , and Grea t Britain on th e Marshal l Plan when Ministe r Moloto v 
had walked out . Bodro v answered Masaryk' s repeate d questio n abou t Czechoslova k 
attendanc e at th e Conferenc e tha t "he did no t have any instruction s in thi s respect, " 
and did no t exclude th e expedienc y of Czechoslova k attendance . On e day before 
Bodrov' s visit, Gottwal d received a telegram from th e Centra l Committe e of th e CPS U 
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recommendin g Czechoslovakia' s attendance . O n July 7, th e Presidiu m confirme d 
th e governmenť s decision on acceptin g th e invitatio n to Pari s for July 12. However , 
on July 8, Mosco w sent Gottwal d a secon d telegram expressing a negative attitud e 
toward s th e Pragu e governmenť s decision . I t is no t know n whethe r Gottwal d receiv-
ed th e telegram before th e delegation' s departur e to Moscow . O n July 9, th e Presi -
dium approve d th e instruction s for th e Czechoslova k delegáte to th e Pari s Confe -
rence . O n th e same day, th e delegatio n conducte d negotiation s with Stalin and Molo -
tov. The y informe d the Pragu e governmen t abou t the result s and recommende d tha t 
th e governmenť s originá l decision concernin g th e Marshal l Plan shoul d be amended . 
O n July 10, after a long and dramati c discussion , th e governmen t revoked its atten -
danc e at th e Conferenc e in Paris . 
Th e following documen t is a recor d of th e negotiation s held by th e Czechoslova k 
governmen t delegatio n with Stalin and Moloto v on 9 July 1947. It was prepare d by 
a Czechoslova k diploma t and come s from th e archive of th e the n Deput y Prim e Min -
ister and Chairma n of th e People' s Party , Jan Šrámek . Th e documen t is par t of th e 
volume of document s "The Marshall Pian and Czechoslovakia" to be publishe d by th e 
Institut e of Contemporar y Histor y of th e Czechoslova k Academ y of Science s 
(ČSAV) in Prague . 
MINUTE S 
OF A VISIT TO GENERALISSIM O J. V. STALIN 
ON 9 JUL Y 1947* 
Present : GeneralissimoJ . V. Stalin 
Ministe r of Foreign Affairs V. M. Moloto v 
Prim e Ministe r Kl. Gottwald,  Minister s J. Masaryk, P. Drtin a 
Ambassadors: Heidrich,  Horák , 
Charge ďaffaires: Bodrov 
By way of introduction , Prime Minister Gottwald said tha t the Czechoslova k Governmen t 
delegation had three question s in mind about which they wished to speak with Generalissim o 
Stalin and Ministe r Molotov . 
These are 1) attendanc e at the Paris Conferenc e 
2) the Franco-Czechoslova k treat y 
3) economi c and trade negotiations . 
/ . Czechoslovakia'sparticipation at the Paris Conference 
Prim e Ministe r Gottwald stated tha t we had, it is true , answered the invitatio n to Paris posi-
tively, but with numerou s serious reservation s which give us the possibility of a free decision . 
The Governmen t of the ČSR was resolved to withdra w its delegáte immediatel y if this should 
turn out to be necessary. But now a new Situatio n has arisen as a result of the fact that we are the 
only one of the Slav states and the only one of all the East Europea n states which has accepte d the 
invitatio n to Paris. Therefore , the Governmen t of the ČSR would like to know the attitud e of 
the USSR . 
Throughou t the translation , quotatio n marks have been set exactly as in the Czech original, 
so as to reflect a certain irregularit y in their use by the Czech author . Thus , no attemp t has 
been made to differentiat e between simple quotation s and quotation s within quotations , and 
frequentl y the ends of quotation s are unmarked . 
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Generalissimo Stalin said: 
After Molotov' s retur n from Paris , th e Governmen t of th e USS R received news of Yugosla-
via's attitude . The n Tataresc u mad e an enquiry . Initially , th e Soviet Governmen t did no t answer 
and conclude d tha t it would be correcte r to go to th e Conferenc e and then , if it shoul d tur n ou t 
necessary , t o leave th e Conference . However , after th e report s from th e Ambassador s of th e 
USS R had arrived , a different opinio n had formed : Th e credit s which are referred to in th e Mar -
shall Pia n are very uncertai n and it turne d ou t tha t "using the pretex t of credit s th e Grea t Power s 
are attemptin g to form a Western bloc and isolate th e Soviet Union " (Generalissim o Stalin said 
thi s verbatim) . 
Generalissim o Stalin continued : "Franc e herself has no programm e for a revival of her eco-
nomy , she is in a difficult financia l Situation , and Grea t Britain is also in dire financia l strait s and 
is struggling with difficulties of an economi c nature , and in špite of thi s bot h Grea t Power s are 
tryin g to pu t togethe r a programm e for th e economi c revival of Europe . But th e main credito r is 
th e USA, because neithe r Franc e no r Englan d has a kopeck . Fo r these reasons , th e Pari s plan s 
did no t appea r serious to th e Governmen t of th e USSR , and no w th e Governmen t of th e USS R 
has becom e convince d on th e basis of factua l reason s tha t it is in fact a questio n of isolatin g th e 
USSR . 
Therefor e th e Governmen t of th e USS R sent telegram s to Tatarescu , Yugoslavia, and th e 
Poles ; the Pole s wavered initially , but the n the y decide d no t to accep t th e invitation . Tha t is why 
th e Governmen t of th e USS R was surprised by ou r decision to accep t th e invitation . 
Generalissim o Stalin continued : "Fo r us, thi s matte r is a "questio n of friendship ."' You 
would no t have any direc t advantage s from attendanc e at th e Conference . Surely you do no t 
want "kulban y je kredity " (i.e . credit s which would endange r ou r economi c and politica l sover-
eignty) . "Th e term s of credi t will certainl y be bad, said Generalissim o Stalin and added : 
"We conside r thi s matte r to be a fundamenta l questio n on which our 3 friendshi p with th e 
USS R depends . If you go to Paris , you will show tha t you want to cooperat e in an actio n aime d 
at isolatin g th e Soviet Union . AU th e Slav states refused, even Albania was no t afraid to refuse, 
and tha t is why we believe tha t you shoul d withdra w you r decision. " 
Minister Masaryk  point s ou t tha t in ou r countr y at th e tim e of th e decision on attendin g th e 
Pari s Conferenc e th e Situatio n was determine d by the generá l knowledge tha t with respec t to raw 
material s we are 60-8 0 % dependen t on th e West. Th e manager s of statě enterprise s keep saying 
to Ministe r Masary k tha t it is necessar y to go to Pari s in orde r no t to miss th e opportunit y of 
obtainin g some credits . 
When th e Polish Governmen t delegatio n arrived in Pragu e last week, Ministe r Masary k spon -
taneousl y and unofficially asked some of th e member s ho w th e Polish Governmen t would 
decid e abou t Polanď s attendanc e at th e Pari s Conference . Th e Polish guests generally replied 
tha t Polan d will go to Pari s and tha t she will be represente d by at least her Ambassador . Ministe r 
Masary k request s tha t th e impressio n shoul d no t arise from thi s remar k tha t we perhap s wante d 
to hide behin d ou r Polish friends . As far as Czechoslovakia' s possible attendanc e at th e Pari s 
Conferenc e is concerned , Ministe r Masary k told the Polish guests that , if we were to accep t th e 
Franco-Britis h invitatio n to atten d th e Pari s Conference , we would do thi s with man y reser-
vations , námel y in such a manne r tha t we can leave the Conferenc e at any tim e we shoul d ascer-
tain tha t thi s is no t welcom e to th e Soviet Governmen t or tha t ou r industry' s hope s prove to be 
positive 4. 
In conclusion , Ministe r Masary k emphasize d tha t all politica l partie s are agreed tha t Czecho -
slovakia may no t undertak e anythin g which would be against th e interest s of th e Soviet Union . 
Th e delegatio n will promptl y notify Pragu e tha t th e Soviet Governmen t consider s acceptanc e of 
the Anglo-Frenc h invitatio n to be an act directe d against it, an d Ministe r Masary k does no t 
doub t in the least tha t th e Czechoslova k Governmen t will act accordingl y withou t delay. But 
Ministe r Masary k her e request s tha t th e Soviet Governmen t help us in ou r delicat e Situation . We 
do no t have any great illusions; perhap s th e matte r coul d be fixed in such a manne r tha t on e 
would go to th e Conferenc e on on e day and leave it on th e next . 
The n Generalissimo Stalin returne d to ou r participatio n in Pari s and said: "Participatio n at th e 
Conferenc e put s you in a falše light. I t is "a break in th e front," 5 it would be a success for th e 
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Western Grea t Powers . Switzerlan d and Sweden are still wavering. Your acceptanc e would 
certainl y also affect thei r decision. " 
„We know, " Generalissim o Stalin continued , "tha t you are ou r friends, ther e is nobod y in 
th e Governmen t of the USS R who would doub t th e friendshi p of th e ČSR for th e Soviet Union . 
But throug h your participatio n in Paris , you would indee d prove tha t you had allowed your -
selves to be misused as a too l against th e USSR . Neithe r th e Soviet Unio n no r th e Governmen t 
would pu t up with this . ("ne perevaril i by") 6 . 
Minister Drtina will no t repea t th e reason s for ou r cours e of actio n in th e matte r of th e Pari s 
Conferenc e which Ministe r Masary k has alread y explained . However , he Stresses tha t also th e 
part y to which he belongs would no t participat e in anythin g in th e field of foreign polic y which 
would appea r as an act directe d against th e Soviet Union . H e greatly welcome s thi s opportunit y 
to emphasiz e thi s here . H e want s it t o be know n tha t Ministe r Drtina' s part y will also con -
sistently pursu e such a polic y as is necessar y to preven t such deals. But Ministe r Dr . Drtin a asks 
tha t Generalissim o Stalin and Ministe r Moloto v conside r on e point : Th e economi c Situatio n of 
th e ČS R is differen t from tha t of th e othe r Slav states , except , of course , th e Soviet Union , i. e. 
th e living standar d of th e ČSR is dependen t above all on foreign trade ; and here , unfortunately , 
th e Situatio n is such tha t 60-8 0 % of ou r trad e depen d on th e West. 
Generalissimo Stalin remark s tha t ou r tradin g balanc e with th e West has been passive. 
Minister Dr. Drtina says tha t thi s is possible, but tha t th e turnove r of ou r trad e with th e West 
is large. 
Generalissimo Stalin remark s tha t ou r export s to th e West are no t great enoug h to cover ou r 
import s if we have to pay in foreign currency . 
Prime Minister Gottwald said tha t we have to pay in foreign currenc y and tha t we onl y have a 
little . 
Generalissimo Stalin laughed and said: "We kno w tha t you have foreign currency " and , tur -
nin g to Ministe r Molotov , he said with a smile: "The y were telling themselve s tha t the y coul d 
obtai n credit s and therefor e the y did no t want to miss thi s chance. " 
Minister Dr. Drtina asks Generalissim o Stalin to look at th e Situatio n in ou r countr y takin g 
int o accoun t th e fear which ou r populatio n has, tha t námel y th e detachmen t from th e West 
shoul d no t result in generá l impoverishment . Tha t would no t onl y have serious economi c conse -
quences , but also politica l ones . Ou r foreign trad e with the Soviet Union , which attaine d a con -
siderable level last year by compariso n with th e pre-Wa r level, too k a downwar d tur n thi s year. 
Ministe r Drtin a expresses th e hop e tha t the negotiation s which are currentl y beginnin g in Mos -
cow will improv e thi s statě of affairs. 
As far as ou r attendanc e at th e Pari s Conferenc e is concerned , th e Governmen t will certainl y 
prepar e itself in accordanc e with what we have determine d here , Ministe r Dr . Drtin a remark s 
and add s what Ministe r Masary k alread y said, tha t th e Governmen t has decide d unanimousl y 
abou t ou r attendanc e in Paris . 
In conclusion , Minister Masaryk  asks tha t th e Soviet Governmen t facilitat e ou r way ou t of 
th e Situation . 
Minister Masaryk  asks Generalissim o Stalin to forgive him for speakin g openl y and says tha t 
in ou r presen t Situatio n we nee d a kind of consolatio n prize , a gesture of th e Soviet side. 
Generalissimo Stalin the n passed on to the economi c Situatio n and said: "Your Situatio n is bet-
ter tha n tha t of Franc e and England . You coul d draft a programm e for th e economi c recover y 
of Franc e and England . Th e USS R is prepare d to help you in your economi c affairs. I will just 
quot e some points : 
1) We need "obsadnyje trúby " 7 drillin g pipes for oil fields. I t would be a matte r of a supply for 
3- 4 years. 
2) We also nee d pipes for petroleu m pipelines . 
3) Track s for narrow-gaug e railways for th e forestry industry . 
4) Wagons. 
5) Electri c motor s (smallish ones) . 
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In thi s connection , Prime Minister Gottwald remarked : "We expor t light industr y products , 
glass, china , footwear , textiles, etc . to th e West. But th e USS R has no t purchase d such product s 
up to now. " 
Generalissimo Stalin: "We can buy these procuct s as well. Generalissim o Stalin added : "Ou r 
harvest is good thi s year. Th e size of ou r countr y leads to th e fact tha t onl y no w can we see th e 
Situatio n clearly. Th e agricultura l plan has been fulfilled, indee d exceeded . We can help ou r 
friends: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland , and also you. " 
In reply to Generalissim o Stalin' s questio n ho w the harvest would be in ou r country , Prim e 
Ministe r Gottwal d declare d tha t it will tur n ou t worse tha n last year and tha t it will be necessar y 
to procur e at least 300,000 tonne s of wheat . 
Whereupo n Generalissim o Stalin replied tha t the USS R coul d give us 200,000 tonne s of 
wheat , also barley and oats . H e adde d tha t th e USS R would buy clover seed from us. Prim e 
Ministe r Gottwal d said tha t we coul d also supply hop s and sugar. Ministe r Masary k said 
jokingly tha t ou r beer is bette r tha n th e Soviet one . Generalissim o Stalin remarke d tha t good beer 
is brewed onl y in Estonia . 
Prime Minister Gottwald returne d to ou r attendanc e in Pari s and asked Generalissim o Stalin 
and Ministe r Moloto w to mak e ou r way ou t of th e difficult Situatio n easier. 
Generalissimo Stalin said: "I can show you th e reason given by th e Bulgarian Governmen t for 
refusing to attend . Th e Romanian s refused withou t giving a reason . 
Th e Pole s replied tha t the y would accep t America n credits , bu t tha t the y would like to nego-
tiat e with th e US A directly , withou t intermediaries. " 
"Then , as far as you are concerned, " Generalissim o Stalin said, "you coul d announc e to Pari s 
as follows: In th e recen t past it has becom e eviden t tha t th e acceptanc e of th e invitatio n coul d be 
interprete d as a blow" (stroke) 8 "against th e USSR, 9 in particula r since non e of th e Slav or 
othe r East Europea n states accepte d th e invitation. " Generalissim o Stalin added : "I believe tha t 
th e soone r you do that , th e better. " 
2. The Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty 
Generalissimo Stalin said: "I read Presiden t Benes' s not e abou t th e treat y in question . I gained 
th e impressio n tha t Presiden t Beneš is of th e opinio n tha t th e USS R for some reason does no t 
wish for your treat y with France . Precisel y th e opposit e is th e truth . We want your treat y with 
France , but we want tha t tha t thi s treat y shoul d no t be worse tha n your treatie s with th e USSR , 
Yugoslavia, and Poland. " 
We kno w you r draft , we also kno w th e Frenc h on e and foun d tha t th e Frenc h draft is worse 
in two essentia l point s tha n your treatie s with th e states mentione d above. 
1. Franc e does no t guarante e you immediate , automati c help . And yet for th e ČSR precisely 
th e Obligation of immediat e help is indispensable . Thi s is no t so importan t for th e USSR ; in th e 
event of an invasion we can withdra w for hundred s of kilometre s and the n begin with th e offen-
sive, but for you a mer e 30 km mea n dangerousl y muc h in view of th e small size of your territory . 
In your treatie s with th e USSR , Yugoslavia, Poland , ther e is a clause abou t immediat e help ; why 
should your treat y with Franc e be worse? 
2. Th e Frenc h draft limit s France' s help just to th e case tha t you shoul d be invaded by Ger -
many . But it does no t guarante e you any help for th e case tha t you shoul d be invaded by any ally, 
satellite of Germany . I t is possible thoug h tha t th e Hungarian s or Austria would invade you , but 
in thi s case, Franc e would no t be obliged to com e to your help . Bear in min d tha t Franc e onc e 
before has failed to adher e to her obligation s to you as an ally. 
Th e Governmen t of th e USS R does no t inten d to advise you no t to conclud e any treat y with 
France , bu t it does advise you no t to mak e a worse treat y tha n thos e with Yugoslavia and Poland . 
Generalissim o Stalin continued : "In ou r treat y with Englan d (th e treat y is for twent y years, 
i. e. unti l 1962), ther e is a clause tha t Englan d is obliged to help us immediately , and no t onl y 
against Germany , but also against satellites. O n th e othe r hand , ou r treat y with Franc e contain s 
th e clause abou t immediat e help , but ther e is n o clause abou t any help against th e satellites. " 
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Generalissim o Stalin added : "We failed to includ e thi s in th e Frenc h treat y (eto m y prozevali") 1 0. 
Thi s happene d because th e treat y with Franc e was no t so importan t for us. As a matte r of fact, 
with th e treaty , we wante d to enhanc e France. " 
Minister Masaryk: point s ou t tha t onl y on e day before th e flight to Moscow , th e Frenc h 
Ambassdor to Pragu e said to him tha t Czechoslovaki a was asking Franc e to give mor e tha n th e 
USS R had granted . Ambassado r Dejea n propose d agreein g by an exchang e of letter s tha t if 
Franc e were to broade n her obligation s toward s th e USS R in th e future , th e mutua l Franco -
Czechoslova k obligation s would automaticall y be broadened . 
Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov stated : Th e initiativ e cam e from Englan d tha t th e 
Soviet-Britis h treat y of friendshi p shoul d be extende d to fifty years. Th e Soviet Governmen t is 
prepare d to do this , but demand s tha t some articles , which weaken th e treaty , be improved . 
Bevin did no t raise any objection s to thi s durin g his visit to Moscow , but when the negotiation s 
began , it becam e clear tha t th e British proposai s actuall y worsen th e treat y considerably . Th e 
new British draft actuall y aims at removin g from th e treat y th e clause abou t immediat e help , 
and also abou t help against Germany' s satellites. However , th e Governmen t of th e USS R deci-
dedly insists on th e treaty' s remainin g unaltere d in thi s poin t and , moreover , demand s th e addi -
tion of th e following clause to th e treaty : 
"Both partie s shall no t participat e in coalition s directe d against on e of th e partie s to th e treaty , 
bu t the y shall also no t participat e "in action s or measure s aime d directl y or indirectly " ' against 
on e of th e treat y parties ." Th e British Governmen t does no t agree with thi s clause. Fo r these rea-
sons, th e negotiation s are no t being continue d for th e moment . 
Prime Minister Gottwald asked whethe r Generalissim o Stalin is of th e opinio n tha t th e 
signing of th e Frenc h treat y on ou r par t migh t someho w have an effect, for example , on th e 
British-Sovie t negotiations . Generalissim o Stalin said: "If you were to sign th e treaty , it would 
certainl y have a negative effect on these negotiations " -
3. Economic affairs 
In conclusion , Prime Minister Gottwald spoke abou t economi c questions . 
1. In Mosco w ther e is a delegatio n of ou r railway expert s at present . In accordanc e with last 
year's negotiations , we assumed tha t th e so-calle d "boot y railway materiál " u (wagons) is ou r 
propeny , but we foun d tha t th e USS R consider s these thing s to be her property . 
Prim e Ministe r Gottwal d requeste d tha t th e Governmen t in th e USS R shoul d help us in thi s 
respect . Generalissim o Stalin said tha t it would be necessar y for ou r delegatio n to speak to th e 
Ministe r of Railways and give him a detaile d list of th e Czechoslova k requests . 
2. Th e Prim e Ministe r informe d Generalissim o Stalin abou t Hungaria n matters . H e em-
phasize d tha t the Hungarian s have been sabotagin g th e transfe r agreemen t and are sabotagin g it 
now, claimin g tha t th e agreemen t had been mad e by Gyöngyösi . Generalissim o Stalin said tha t 
ther e is no w a bette r Governmen t in Hungary , but Prim e Ministe r Gottwal d answered tha t thi s 
Governmen t is also sabotagin g th e transfe r agreement . H e adde d tha t he has onl y mentione d this 
for Generalissim o Stalin' s information . 
3. Prim e Ministe r Gottwal d furthe r mentione d ou r interne d person s and th e families of Svo-
boda' s troops . Generalissim o Stalin said tha t it is necessar y to dra w attentio n to these matter s by 
a notě . 
Th e visit ende d at 24.30 hours 1 3 
1 Th e Czec h text contain s th e Russian term "vopros družby" . 
2 Th e Czec h text her e contain s a Russian ter m th e meanin g of which is no t clear ; possibly a 




5 Th e Russian ter m "proryv fronta " set in quotatio n mark s is ušed here . 
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6 The Russian text is placed in parentheses behind the Czech. 
7 The Czech text contains the Russian term in quotation marks. 
8 The alternative term is set in parentheses outside of the quotation marks. 
9 The Czech text just contains the abbreviation SSR. 
10 The Russian text is set in parentheses in the Czech text; the quotation marks are also set as 
here. 
The text in quotation marks is quoted in Russian. 
12 The Russian term "trofejnoe zeleznoderoznoe" is used and is misspelt as rendered here. 
13 00.30 hours. 
Analysis by Vojtech Mastný 
The Soviet rejection in July 1947 of the American invitation to participate in the 
Marshall Plan has long been recognized as a milestone on the road to the Cold War. 
But what the milestone actually marks has not been entirely clear. Was Moscow bent 
on rejecting the plan all along, or did it originally consider accepting it and sub-
sequently reverse itself ? Why did it take part in the preparatory discussions convened 
in Paris at the end of June? Did Stalin deliberately mislead his east European allies 
about his intentions, only to demand their own rejection as the acid test of their wil-
lingness to obey him unconditionally? The document printed above and published 
here for the first time sheds new light on all these questions. It is the contemporary 
record of the meeting in Moscow on 9 July 1947, as a result of which Czechoslovakia 
withdrew its previously announced intention to participate in the American 
program'. 
Both apologists and critics of Soviet policy have maintained that Moscow always 
regarded the Marshall Plan unacceptable and merely joined the Paris discussions to 
dissuade others from participating. Three months later, Stalin's chief ideologist 
Andrei A. Zhdanov retrospectively denounced the American offer of aid as a sinister 
design aimed at depriving European states of their sovereignty and reviving Germa-
ny's "monopolistic concerns." He added pointedly that "it was well known before-
hand that the USSR would refuse American assistance on the terms proposed by 
Marshall" and went to the Paris talks only to "exposé" its true nature2. Zhdanov'spost 
mortem seemed to substantiate the premonition of U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, 
Walter Bedell Smith, who already on June 23 had cabled to Washington that Soviet 
Foreign Minister Viacheslav M. Molotov was going to Paris "for destructive rather 
than constructive purposes."3 
Yet the Soviet conduct at the Conference rather showed that Molotov, having arrived 
there with a retinue of some hundred assistants, wanted assurances that he could 
have the American cake and eat it, too. He tried to induce the United States to extend 
1 Unless indicated otherwise, all source references in this essay are to the document printed 
above. 
2 Zhdanov's speech at the founding meeting of the Cominform, September 22, 1947, Rush , 
Myron (ed.): The International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy: Key Reports by Soviet 
Leaders from the Revolution to the Present. Columbus, OH 1970, p. 135. 
3 Smith to Secretary of State, June 23, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 
(1947), vol. 3. Washington, DC 1972, p. 266. 
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the Marshall aid on Soviet rather than its own terms. Countering the American insist-
ence that the recipient states take the initiative in jointly calculating their needs and 
cooperate in ensuring the most effective distribution of the available resources, Mos-
cow simply wanted each to announce its needs, whereupon Washington would be 
expected to deliver4. 
Stalin subsequently told the Czechoslovak representatives that the credits mentioned 
in the Marshall Plan were "very uncertain." He more likely meant that he did not 
believe the United States could possibly be so generous without ulterior purposes. In 
any case, he rightly observed that the credits were a formula which the great powers 
were trying to use "to form a Western bloc and isolate the Soviet Union." 
In Paris, Molotov first proposed to find out how large credits the U.S. government 
was prepared to extend and whether Congress was willing to approve them . How-
ever, since no one familiär with the American political systém could expect an answer 
to this hypothetical question, he soon abandoned the inquiry, trying instead to win 
West Europeans, particularly the French, for his concept of a Marshall Plan on Soviet 
terms. Testing how strong were the persisting French fears of Germany, he proposed 
to discriminate in the provision of aid against the Germans and their former allies. He 
supported the French idea of a steering committee of the aid recipients, provided 
no inquiry would be made into their resources and the ex-enemy states would be 
admitted at most in an consultative capacity6. 
Some members of the French delegation estimated that Moscow believed the 
European nations would be unable to draw up an effective pian whereupon the United 
States would be unwilling to advance the credits 7. The Czechoslovak document print-
ed above adds weight to this estimate of the Soviet premises. Stalin was skeptical espe-
cially about the ability of France and Great Britain to get their act together. He told 
the Czechoslovak delegation that they both were in great financial difficulties, yet 
were "trying to put together a program for the economic revival of Europe." He 
implied that they could not possibly succeed unless they were prepared to act as the 
front men of the United States. In Stalin's opinion, "the main creditor is the United 
States, because neither France nor England has a kopeck." 
From this analysis, it follows that Stalin must have originally believed that winning 
the two destitute powers for his concept of a Marshall Plan on Soviet terms was both 
necessary and feasible. During the session on June 30, Molotov restated the terms, at 
which point he was handed by an aide what was or was made to appear a decoded mes-
sage just received from Moscow8. The message, whose content remains unknown, did 
not change the Soviet position: Molotov simply continued to repeat it. What did 
change was that later in the day, in a departure from its previous insistence on secrecy, 
the Soviet delegation made the position public at a press Conference9. It may be 
4 Caffery to Secretary of State, July 1, 1947, FRUS (1947), vol. 3, pp. 303-304. 
5 Caffery to Secretary of State, June 28, 1947, i b i d., pp. 297-298. 
6 Caffery to Secretary of State, June 28 and 29, 1947, ibid., pp. 299-300. 
7 The estimate by Maurice Couve de Murville and Hervé Alphand reported by Caffery to 
Secretary of State, July 3,1947, ibid., p. 309. 
8 Caffery to Secretary of State, July 1, 1947, i b i d., pp. 301-302. 
9 Ibid., p. 303. 
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surmised that the message had given Molotov the necessary authorization to do so, 
then wait for a possible effect and finally, if none were forthcoming, walk out of the 
Conference and leave town. This was, in any case, what happened by July 2. 
Whatever their opinion about its materiál worth, the Soviets evidently overesti-
mated their ability to have the Marshall Plan on their own terms. Otherwise they 
would have hardly left their east European allies so completely unprepared for its 
rejection. One of the allies, the dogmatic revolutionary Yugoslavia, had been, if any-
thing, even more apprehensive of a putative imperialist ploy than Stalin was. Yet even 
this Yugoslavia at the beginning of July indicated to the British and French ambassa-
dors its intention to attend a second preparatory meeting, which their governments 
proposed to reconvene in the French capital on July 1210. When Stalin met with the 
Czechoslovak delegation on July 9, he used the Yugoslav position as the point of 
departure in his explaining how the Soviet policy had changed. 
Stalin contended that even after Walking out from the first Conference the Soviet 
government considered attending the second, though with the intention of leaving it 
again if necessary. This was the same tactic that Milován Djilas, the second highest-
ranking Yugoslav communist, later reported as having been advocated to him by 
Molotov at the first Paris meeting in regard to east European countries . In any case, 
none of these countries had a reason to regard Molotov's departure from Paris as Mos-
cow's final word affecting their own freedom of action. Among them, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were especially eager to partake in the prospective American bounty. 
Of the two, the Warsaw government, though by this time far more communist-
dominated than the Czechoslovak one, was moving ahead more decisively12. For its 
part, the Czechoslovak government proceeded with caution. On July 2, the day of 
Molotov's Paris walkout, Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk checked with Soviet chargé 
d'affaires in Prague Bobrov, and only after the Soviet diplomat had voiced no objec-
tion did he recommend to the cabinet that Czechoslovakia accept the invitation to the 
second Paris meeting13. 
The cabinet, presided over by the Communist Premier, Klement Gottwald, approv-
ed the recommendation unanimously on July 4, and made its decision public. By that 
time, Moscow had already sent out messages urging Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland 
not to go to Paris; according to Stalin's account, only "the Poles wavered initially, 
but then they decided not to accept the invitation." Czechoslovakia was not originally 
included among the countries that Stalin tried to bar from attending the Paris gather-
ing. Yet even before he voiced any displeasure with its participation, its government 
left no doubt that, if faced with a choice, it valued its staying in Moscow's good graces 
higher than the Marshall Plan. 
On July 7, Masaryk instructed the Czechoslovak representatives to the prospective 
Paris meeting to remain reserved14. Paraphrasing the instructions two days later in 
10 Korbe l , Josef: Tito's Communism. Denver 1951, pp. 281-282. 
11 Dji las , Milován: Conversations with Stalin. New York 1962, pp. 99 f. 
12 R ipka , Hubert: CzechoslovakiaEnslaved. London 1950, p. 53. 
13 Kap lan , Karel: 11 piano di Stalin. Panorama [Milan] 15, No. 575 (April 26, 1977), 
pp.179-180. 
14 Ripka: Czechoslovakia Enslaved, p. 54. 
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Stalin' s presence , he explaine d the m as implyin g attendanc e "with man y reservations , 
námel y in such a manne r tha t we can leave th e Conferenc e at any tim e if we should 
ascertai n tha t [ou r participation ] is no t welcom e to th e Soviet government. " Masary k 
furthe r reminde d Stalin tha t his country' s "all politica l partie s are agreed tha t Cze -
choslovaki a ma y no t undertak e anythin g which would be against th e interest s of th e 
Soviet Union. " Thi s was th e axiom proclaime d and promote d by th e country' s highly 
respecte d President , Edvar d Beneš , ever since 194315. 
I t is therefor e misleadin g to say, as has been commonplac e in Western literatuř e on 
th e subject, tha t Stalin , having decide d to reverse Czechoslovakia' s announce d partici -
patio n in th e Marshal l Plan , "summoned " its representative s to Moscow , no r could 
thei r reversal be describe d as being reluctantl y execute d unde r irresistible pressure 1 6. 
Th e visit by th e Czechoslova k delegation , featurin g bot h Masary k and Gottwald , had 
been planne d for some time , an d th e Marshal l Plan had no t originally been on th e 
agenda . Indeed , when the visitors me t with Stalin and Moloto v late at night on July 9, 
it was no t th e Soviet dictato r but th e Czechoslova k communis t premié r who starte d 
th e conversatio n by solicitin g Moscow' s opinio n abou t his govermenť s acceptanc e of 
th e Pari s invitation . 
Thi s openin g ma y have been prearrange d if it is true , as has been plausibly suggested 
but no t proved , tha t earlier tha t day Gottwal d had alread y me t with Stalin secretly ä 
deux. Prearrange d or not , Stalin' s deman d to cance l th e decision to go to Pari s was 
phrase d rathe r gently, certainl y by th e despot' s Standards . Th e farthes t he went in 
pressing it was by describin g it as "a fundamenta l question, " on which Czechoslova -
kia's "friendship with th e USS R depends. " H e maintaine d tha t "if you go to Paris , you 
will show tha t you want to cooperat e in an actio n aimed at isolatin g th e Soviet Union . 
AU Slav states refused, no t even Albania was afraid to refuse, and so we believe tha t 
you shoul d withdra w your decision. " 
Th e Soviet mean s of pressure were limited . Unlik e in Polan d and elsewhere in 
eastern Europe , ther e were n o Soviet troop s in Czechoslovakia , no r did communist s 
contro l its government . Yet pressure was no t needed , for its leader s were quit e read y 
to oblige anyway. I t was Masary k th e democrat , no t Gottwal d th e communist , who 
first assured Stalin tha t "the delegatio n will promptl y notify Pragu e tha t th e Soviet 
governmen t consider s acceptanc e of th e Anglo-Frenc h invitatio n to be an act directe d 
against it, " addin g tha t he "did no t doub t in th e least tha t th e Czechoslova k govern-
men t will act accordingl y withou t delay. " 
Fa r from questionin g th e justice of th e Soviet demand , th e Foreig n Ministe r currie d 
Stalin' s favor by insistin g tha t Czechoslovaki a nevěr really had any "great illusions" 
abou t th e Marshal l Plan . Hi s main concer n was to solicit Soviet help in devising some 
face-savin g proceduř e tha t would make th e abject reversal palatabl e to th e Czecho -
slovak and Western public . H e though t tha t everythin g migh t be fixed by "going to 
th e Conferenc e on on e day and leaving it on th e next. " 
Cf. minute s of the Beneš-Moloto v conversation , Decembe r 14, 1943. In : M a s t n ý , Voj-
tech : The Beneš-Stalin-Moloto v Conversation s in 1943: Ne w Documents . JbG O 20 (1972), 
p. 380. 
For example, in Danie l Yer gin: Shattere d Peace . Boston 1977, p. 316. 
Stalin,  Czechoslovakia, and the Marshall Plan 143 
Othe r Czechoslova k delegates present , includin g Gottwald , at least tried to defend 
thei r origina l interes t in th e Marshal l Plan by alludin g to thei r country' s dependenc e 
on Western trade . But the y had no good answer to Stalin' s remar k tha t th e balanc e of 
tha t trad e was passive. In th e end , the y all begged him to help the m und o th e decision 
the y had mad e unanimously . Describin g his talk as "open, " Masary k spoke of 
th e need for some sort of a "band-aid, " a gesture from th e Soviet side. Yet non e was 
forthcomin g from a despo t nevěr know n for wantin g to mak e life easier for his 
stooges. H e urged Pragu e to simply State tha t "In th e recen t past it has becom e 
eviden t tha t th e acceptanc e of th e invitatio n coul d be interprete d as a blow against 
th e USSR. " 
Upo n his retur n home , Masary k reportedl y complaine d to his friends tha t he had 
left for Mosco w as th e foreign ministe r of a sovereign statě and had returne d from ther e as 
Stalin' s stooge 1 7. Pitifu l thoug h his predicamen t was, his governmen t had long before 
circumscribe d its sovereignty by makin g Soviet wishes th e lodesta r of its foreign 
policy. In thi s regard , its predictabl e reversal in th e matte r of th e Marshal l Plan change d 
little . However , ther e were to be furthe r Soviet demands , with no end in sight. 
Durin g th e same Mosco w meetin g on July 9, Stalin responde d to Benes' s memoran -
du m abou t th e draft of Czechoslovakia' s projecte d treat y with France . Insistin g tha t 
he did no t oppos e th e treaty , he stated enigmaticall y tha t it only mus t no t be "worse" 
tha n thos e tha t Czechoslovaki a had conclude d with th e Soviet Unio n and its east 
Europea n allies. In his opinion , th e defect of th e draft was in its failure to make Frenc h 
assistance "automatic " and applicabl e no t only against German y but also its possible 
allies. H e mad e th e incredibl e remar k tha t "it is, of course , possible tha t you migh t be 
invaded by th e Hungarian s or Austria. " 
It would have been all but impossible to divine what Stalin really wante d if he had 
no t alluded to London' s recen t proposa l to dro p th e clause abou t automati c assistance 
against Germany' s potentia l allies from th e 1942 British-Sovie t treat y tha t was 
currentl y being considere d for extension . Stalin said tha t he had furthe r tried , but 
withou t success, to inser t int o th e text a provision tha t would bar th e signatorie s from 
takin g par t in an y coalitio n aime d directl y or indirectl y against each other . And thi s 
was th e provision he wante d Czechoslovaki a to pu t int o its treat y with Franc e as well. 
To Gottwald' s helpfu l questio n of whethe r th e conclusio n of th e Czechoslovak -
Frenc h treat y would adversely affect th e Soviet-Britis h negotiations , Stalin replied 
tha t it would , thu s leaving n o doub t tha t he oppose d th e treat y after all. 
Littl e did th e hapless Czechoslova k officials suspect ho w muc h th e cauchemar des 
alliances haunte d th e might y Soviet leader . I t was suggestive of his nightmar e tha t he 
neede d little Czechoslovaki a to help avert it and tha t he proceede d in such a round -
abou t way before arriving at th e mai n point . But it was alread y to o late to arrest 
th e tren d towar d th e eventua l formatio n of hostil e alliance s tha t his quest for Soviet 
securit y at th e price of everybody eise's insecurit y had so outstandingl y helpe d to 
precipitate . 
H e r b e n , Ivan: Commen t Staline empéch a la Tchécoslovaqui e de participe r au plan Mar-
shall. Le Figaro , August 12, 1948. 
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Unlike Czechoslovakia, Britain and France gave in July 1947 a proof that they 
valued American assistance more than Soviet friendship. Summing up the outcome of 
the Marshall Plan crisis on July 11, Ambassador Smith viewed the Soviet veto of the 
Czechoslovak participation as "nothing less than a declaration of war by the Soviet 
Union on the immediate issue of the control of Europe." Given the Soviet sense of 
weakness, he was overstating the case. But he was quite right in concluding that now 
„the lineš are drawn."18 
Smith to Secretary of State, July 10, 1947, FRUS (1947), vol. 3, p. 327. 
